Written by Rachel Riordan, Esq.
Statutory interpretation is the process by which courts interpret and apply legislation. Some amount of interpretation is often necessary when a case involves a statute. Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and straightforward meaning. In other cases, the words of a statute are vague enough to allow a Deputy Commissioner to infer his or her own interpretation of the meaning of words.
In Roberson v. Peninsula Auto Painting, Jurisdiction Claim No. 1353553 (April 28, 2016), the Commission addressed the claimant’s request for a hand brake for his motorcycle. The claimant sustained a compensable right knee injury which, unfortunately, developed an infection requiring an above-the-knee amputation. The claimant requested payment for the modification of his motorcycle.
Virginia Code Section 65.2-603 addresses the defendants’ responsibility for medical equipment and modifications. The statute includes modifications to the claimant’s home and automobile up to $42,000.00 per accident. Pertinent to the statutory dispute in Roberson, it provides for “modifications to or equipment for the employee’s automobile…”
The Deputy Commissioner, in his ruling, acknowledged that a motorcycle is not precisely an automobile, but it serves the same purpose and is an automated means of transportation. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner believed the term “automobile” was vague and it could reasonably be interpreted to be any automated means of transportation, including a motorcycle.
The employer argued the word “automobile” was not vague and a motorcycle is not an automobile. In other Virginia statutes, the term “motor vehicle” has been specifically defined as an “automobile, motorcycle, mobile home, truck, van or other vehicle operating on public highways and streets.” Virginia Code Section 6.2-2200. Although the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act does not define “automobile,” other statutes have subdivided the definition of “motor vehicle” into categories such as “automobiles” and “motorcycle.” For example, registration and licensure under Title 46.2 separates “automobile” from “motorcycle.” Virginia Code Section 46.2-357.
The Full Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner and found that the word “motor vehicle” appears to be used interchangeably but “automobile” does not. Virginia Code Section 65.2-603 uses the word “automobile” and not “motor vehicle” when outlining the claimant’s medical equipment and modification rights. Therefore, the Full Commission found that a motorcycle is a motor vehicle, but not an automobile by using strict canons of statutory interpretation. The word automobile could not be broadened by the judiciary to include any automated means of transportation. In other words, the word automobile was not vague or broad enough for the Deputy Commissioner to infer his or her interpretation of the meaning of the word as that role is vested in the legislature. The claimant lost his claim for modifications to his motorcycle.
The takeaway from this recent ruling is not to overlook the plain meaning of words in statutes. Another example can be found in the penalty section of 65.2-524, which provides for 20% penalties for the failure to pay “compensation” within two weeks after it becomes due. Compensation has been defined as temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial, and permanent total disability benefits. Therefore, there cannot be 20% penalties under this code section for the late payment of COLA, mileage, etc. Of course, Deputy Commissioners have broad discretion to award sanctions or attorney’s fees for behaviors or pleadings filed without a good faith basis.
The workers’ compensation attorneys at KPM LAW are happy to answer your questions about how the facts of your case are likely to be interpreted based upon the statutes enumerated in the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act.