by kpmAdmin | Jul 16, 2018 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized, Updates
Written by Kate Adams, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. In the 2018 legislative session there were a number of important bills before the Senate and House of Representatives that could have had a substantial impact on the damages claims Plaintiffs are allowed to make and the amount of punitive damages plaintiffs can receive. Senate Bill 895 sought to increase the cap on punitive damages from $350,000 to $600,000. After the bill was initially proposed it was amended by the Senate, which reduced the sought after increase from $600,000 to $500,000. This version of the Bill passed the Senate but when sent to the House of Representatives for consideration, it failed to pass. A second attempt at increasing the amount of punitive damages recoverable by a plaintiff, House Bill 1305, was much broader and sought to eliminate the limitation on punitive damage awards all together. This bill did not gain support in the House of Representatives and failed to make it out of subcommittee. Efforts to increase the cap on punitive damages have been before the House and Senate three times in the past four years. In 2016 and 2015 there were similar bills to Senate Bill 895 that sought to increase the cap on punitive damages. Senate Bill 111 in 2016 sought to increase the punitive damage cap from $350,000 to $500,000. This bill, like the recent Senate Bill 895, passed the Senate but did not pass the House of Representatives. In 2015 House Bill 2360 sought to increase the punitive damage cap from $350,000 to $750,000. The Bill also failed to make it out of the House...
by kpmAdmin | Jul 16, 2018 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Matthew Liller, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. Several attorneys at KPM LAW have dual licensure in Virginia and West Virginia. This article seeks to highlight some key differences between the two states which may play significant roles in defending claims across the borders. I. Statutes of Limitations Both states employ a two year limitations period for bodily injury. However, West Virginia’s property damage limitations period is also just two years, while Virginia’s is five years. W. Va. Code § 55-1-12(a); V. Code § 8.01-243(B). As to contracts, Virginia employs a three year limitations period for oral contracts and five year limitations period for written contracts. Va. Code § 8.01-246(2)-(3). West Virginia employs a ten year limitations period for contracts in writing signed by the party to be charged, and a five year limitations period for any other contract (including oral), express or implied. W. Va. Code § 55-2-6. II. Comparative or Contributory Negligence Virginia is a pure contributory negligence state, meaning if the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to his accident he may not recover. See generally, Estate of Moses v. Southwestern Va. Transit Mgmt. Co., 273 Va. 622, 643 S.E.2d 156 (2007). West Virginia recognizes modified comparative negligence, allowing a plaintiff to recover damages in proportion to the amount of fault they hold, so long as they are less than 50% at fault for the accident. Tug valley Parm. v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cnty., 235 W. Va. 283, 773 S.E.2d 627 (2015). III. Joint and Several Liability / Right of Contribution Virginia is a joint and several liability state, meaning each tortfeasor is responsible...
by kpmAdmin | Jul 16, 2018 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Gary Reinhardt, Esq. In a case decided on June 21, 2018, the Western District of Virginia, by the Honorable Norman K. Moon, affirmed the broad scope of the auto exclusion. In Admiral Ins. Co. v. W.W. Associates, Inc., et al., (Case No. 3:17-cv-00027), the Court applied the auto exclusion to a professional services policy issued to an engineering firm. In W.W., plaintiffs in an underlying suit alleged that they suffered injuries, and even a death, following an automobile accident. Part of the allegations included that the road where the accident happened was negligently designed. W.W., the engineers, gave notice of the suit to Admiral. Admiral asserted the automobile exclusion while defending under a reservation of rights. The policy exclusion barred coverage for “any claim which arises from, or is related to, any collision or accident involving an automobile.” Admiral then filed a Declaratory Judgment Action moving the Court to find the auto exclusion applicable and holding that Admiral did not owe W.W. a defense nor indemnity. W.W. responded by claiming that the policy exclusion was ambiguous. First, W.W. challenged the use of the word “claim.” The policy defined “claim” and W.W. asserted that substituting the policy definition for the word “claim” in the exclusion rendered the auto exclusion “‘unintelligible.’” (Page 5 of the Opinion). The Court was not convinced, writing that W.W. was “straining” to find an ambiguity. “Even if ‘claim’ was not defined in the Policy, the Fourth Circuit has had little trouble defining the word when unaccompanied by a definition.” (Id., citing Ball v. NCRIC, Inc., 40 App’x 760,764 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The most common...
by kpmAdmin | Jun 18, 2018 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Kevin Kennedy, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. The Virginia General Assembly has completed its 2018 legislative session and has enacted several new statutes impacting the insurance defense industry and legal practice. Perhaps the most significant developments from the last session were several bills advanced by the plaintiff’s bar which failed to pass, resulting in the preservation of important Virginia Supreme Court decisions that will continue to shape case evaluation and strategy moving forward. New laws going into effect on July 1, 2018, with special import to our readers are highlighted below, as well as a few noteworthy failed bills. Required policy limits disclosure for insureds convicted of Driving Under the Influence. Senate Bill 535. Pursuant to the existing language of Va. Code § 8.01-417.01, if a plaintiff is able to produce a total of $12,500 in medical bills and/or lost wages attributable to an accident, the plaintiff’s attorney may submit a request to the alleged tortfeasor’s insurer with a request to disclose the applicable policy limits. Under those circumstances, the insurer is required to respond within 30 days to confirm the amount of the policy limits which may potentially apply to the claim. As of July 1, 2018, the circumstances surrounding required disclosure have been expanded. Under the expanded provision, if an alleged tortfeasor has been convicted of driving under the influence, the plaintiff or his attorney may request disclosure of the policy limits regardless of the amount of any medical bills or lost wages claimed by the plaintiff. Consistent with the prior statute, the insurer must respond within 30 days to confirm the amount of...
by kpmAdmin | Jun 18, 2018 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Megan E. Cook, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. Whether viewed from a defense or plaintiff standpoint, after a party has provided false discovery information, the opposing party’s response should be to file a Motion for Sanctions against the party who provided the false information. Virginia Courts have awarded sanctions against the violating party for false interrogatory answers and false deposition testimony numerous times. The case of Doe v. Va. Wesleyan College provides a succinct analysis of how to properly discuss one’s arguments supporting a Motion for Sanctions. 93 Va. Cir. 215 (2016). The core arguments begin with an analysis of Virginia Code § 8.01-271.1 and Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:12. The pertinent part of Section 8.01-271.1 of the Code of Virginia states: “Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name…A party who is not represented by an attorney, including a person confined in a state or local correctional facility proceeding pro se, shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper [and] (ii) to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact…” The court in Doe interprets this as saying that sanctions under this statute are only available against the attorney. 93 Va. Cir. at 226. Otherwise, as the statute discusses, sanctions can be assessed against a pro se litigant...
